This paper discusses the role of opportunistic punisher who may act selfishly to free-ride cooperators or not to be exploited by defectors. To consider opportunistic punisher, we make a change to the sequence of one-shot public good game; instead of putting action choice first before punishment, the commitment of punishment is declared first before choosing the action of each participant. In this commitment-first setting, punisher may use information about her team, and may defect to increase her fitness in the team. Reversing sequence of public good game can induce different behavior of punisher, which cannot be considered in standard setting where punisher always chooses cooperation. Based on stochastic dynamics developed by evolutionary economists and biologists, we show that opportunistic punisher can make cooperation evolve where cooperative punisher fails. This alternative route for the evolution of cooperation relies paradoxically on the players' selfishness to profit from others' unconditional cooperation and defection.
Introduction
Public good game (PGG) is one of the most active research themes in economics and evolutionary biology for last ten years. In typical PGG experiments, G individuals have the opportunity to cooperate and bestow a fixed amount q into a common resource, or to defect and input nothing. The total amount in the common is multiplied by a factor r and equally distributed among the members without regard to their contributions. Average return of unit investment is qr/G where G is the size of a team. If r < G, a rational player does not contribute, and Nash equilibrium is universal defection. But, assuming that all of members cooperates, the return is (r − 1)q that is larger than that from defection. This is a classic social dilemma that the Nash equilibrium is different from the social optimum. As for the case of Prisoner's Dilemma, academic interests around PGG also have focused on ways and mechanisms that make the evolution of cooperation possible. For this purpose, besides from introducing reputation effect by repeating games, two theoretical methods has been proposed: i) stern punishment that is unrelated to payoff consideration ii) the option that players exit from the game.
For the first direction, Fehr and Gächter (2000) shows experimental evidences by conducting two-stage version of PGG. 1 Obviously, sub-game perfect equilibrium is that agents never punish in stage two as it lowers their payoff; hence punishment is not a factor in decisions in stage one; hence no contributions in stage one as usual. But, ample of experimental studies consistently show that availability of the punishment mechanism increases contributions markedly relative to their absence. Further, some punishment does occur actually.
This influential work has been followed by numerous studies that explore around punishment, and this implies that punishment in PGG is a key part of institutional and behavioral mechanism to overcome the social dilemma of cooperation (Ledyard, 1997; Sigmund, 2007) . But, a big piece of puzzle about punishment is that punishment itself cannot be evolutionarily favored because this behavior cannot get higher payoff or fitness than defection. Let us imagine the situation that all of population consists of defectors. When a mutant punisher comes about, her payoff cannot exceed that of other defectors as long as sufficient cost of punishment is imposed. Even though the role of punishment in the evolution of cooperation in PGG may be reasonably accepted, this behavior may not be selected and survive in evolutionary process.
Another direction of research based on evolutionary dynamics tries the power of exit options that makes players avoid worst outcomes in PGG. The idea is that defection in PGG can be circumvented by making players choose an option that has an intermediate value between universal defection and highfrequency cooperation. Brandt et al. (2003) shows that exit option makes evolutionary cycle among cooperation, defection and exit by replicator dynamics.
According to its conclusion, however, this evolutionary cycle by exit option cannot help the evolution of cooperation in that three strategy enjoys same payoff or fitness, which means that the participation in PGG is not better than exit option. Hauert et al. (2007) proposes that two directions may be interwoven in the evolution of cooperation. Their Intuition is that defectors may break the homogeneous population of cooperators, but the equilibrium based on universal defection can be also shaken by the exit option. When all of population chooses exiting, cooperation or cooperation with punishment is better choice for players. If we focus on homogeneous sates, these four states are in evolutionary cycles. Based on evolutionary dynamics, Hauert et al. (2007) shows that cooperative state can be dominant state, which is a route for the evolution of cooperation in one-shot PGG game.
Based on former studies, this paper tries to consider an unexplored theoretical element in PGG by stochastic evolutionary dynamics. We investigate the role and the effectiveness of punishment in PGG by assuming slightly different setting of PGG and behavioral pattern of punisher. For this, the sequence of standard PGG, strategy choice first and punishment with the information of players' action, is reversely arranged. So to speak, players commit their punishment first, and choices action with this information. Also, we introduce the opportunistic punisher who chooses its strategy based on the number of punisher in her team. Hence, for this new type of punisher, the information about punishing commitment plays a key role in choosing their actions. Even though defection of the punisher can hurt herself if she chooses defection, this choice may pay when there is sufficiently large number of cooperators. Intuitively, different from Hauert et al. (2007) where the punisher is originated from cooperator, our punisher is opportunistic in that they deviates from cooperative strategy when it pays.
The organization of the paper is following: Section 2 succinctly describes the basic of our PGG and methodology we reply on, stochastic (adaptive) dynamics. Section 3 shows numerical cases our main discussion. Section 4 presents theoretical extension of this paper with assuming Section 5 is concluding remarks.
Setup and Method

PGG, Nash equilibrium and Punishment
This paper is based on a G-person game called Public Good Game. We consider a well-mixed population of constant size M ≥ 2, and G individuals are randomly selected and offered the option to participate PGG. Each should decide whether to contribute for the public good or not; cooperate (C) or defect (D). For simplicity, players invest fixed an amount c, we assume that the contributions of all G C cooperators are multiplied by r > 1 and then divided among all G players participating in the game. The payoff for each C and D are given by
Nash equilibrium is easily given by considering the benefit generated by switching from C to D, which is c(1 − r G ). It is obvious that players would play D as long as r < G. This is the social dilemma that resembles Prisoner's Dilemma. Most of interests around evolutionary game theory lie in finding routes or mechanism to overcome this uncooperative state. Can this social dilemma be evaded through positive or negative devices specifically directed towards individual players? In this paper, we shall focus on negative and neutral mechanism: punishment and exit. 2 When she quits, σ is her payoff. We call her the Loner (L). When she participates, her types differentiate her act in a team. The cooperator (C) contributes c = 1 amount to the team, and the defector (D) does not contribute, but free-rides on other C in her team. After this first round interaction, each team member can impose a fine β upon each target at a personal cost γ for each fine. The punisher (P ) does this costly behavior against its own benefit.
For following discussion, basic parameters are summarized as follows:
For considering stochastic dynamics in finite populations, the groups engaging in a public goods game are given by multivariate hyper-geometric sampling. This sampling affects payoffs of each interaction between two types.
Resulting payoffs, fixation probabilities and limiting distribution are given in Appendix B
Parameters Description
M
The size of total population G The size of PGG group r
The multiplier of PGG β
The amount of punishment on a target per punishment γ
The cost of punishment incurred per punishment σ
The payoff of loner leaving a team In evolutionary game theory, stochastic (adaptive) dynamics was introduced to understand long-run behavior, which may differ fundamentally from the behavior of the deterministic process by law of large number, replicator dynamics. In replicator dynamics, a state is locally asymptotically stable if any sufficiently small deviation from the original state vanishes. Young (1993) criticizes this approach because it treats shocks as if they were isolated events. Considering that economic system has constant perturbation from various sources, this assumption of arbitrarily small shock is unsatisfactory.
Especially, persistent shocks can accumulate and tip the process out of the basin of attraction of asymptotically stable state. Thus, when shock is persistent, generally accepted equilibrium concept, evolutionarily stable strategies, cannot be used to explain long-term behavior of economic system. Especially, this theory can predict the probability of staying in different equilibria inde-pendently of the initial conditions. The persistent shocks act as a selection mechanism, and the selection intensity increases the less likely the shocks are.
In the long-run distribution relies on the probability of escaping from various states, and this are the function of exponential in error rate. This idea was firstly formalized by Freidlin and Wentzell (1998) . 3 Stochastic stability was used to the problem of equilibrium selection in games by Kandori et al. (1993) and Young (1993) . But, these economic applications are based on "order-of-magnitude" comparisons for the transitions between the various recurrent classes of no-mutation process (Ellison, 2000) .
By this method, one state can be selected as a long-term equilibrium, which is perturbed least by adaptive dynamics, as mutation is trivialized as necessary.
Taylor et al. (2004) analyzes a similar but different version of stochastic
no-mutation process, where a single mutation can lead to a transition from one absorbing state to another. In this theory, the equilibrium depends on the "expected speed of flow" at every absorbing state. This assumes that a single mutant can escape each absorbing state from other types, and the fate of this mutant is determined by fixation probability of two underlying types. Also, Fudenberg and Imhof (2006) shows that there exists sufficiently small mutation rate that no two individual mutant types cannot coexist. So to speak, the fate of a mutant, its elimination or fixation, is settled before the next mutant appears. Thus the transitions between each homogeneous state occur when a mutant appears and spreads to fixation.
The advantage of this model is that transition matrix can be nicely formulated by a Markov chain with state space that consists of each homogeneous sate and fixation probability of each state against one another. For this Markov-style transition matrix, unique vectors can be calculated, which is interpreted as invariant distribution of underlying stochastic process. Com-pared with Kandori et al. (1993) and Young (1993) , this method shows relative probabilities that each homogeneous state spend with respect to competing others. Appendix A summarizes the method of Fudenberg and Imhof (2006) .
Cooperative vs. Opportunistic Punishment
To consider 
Sequence of one-shot PGG
Most of researches including Hauert et al. (2007) has assumed an one-shot PGG where players decide strategy or action first, and punish accordingly if some of them want to. In this standard setup, the punisher is originated from C and punishing behavior depends on the information on action choices of players. What if this sequence be reversed? Players commit their punishment first, and choose its action later. For simplicity, commitment is assumed to be always credible, and the number of commitment is announced for participants of a team. For C, D and L who do not care for doing punishment, this reversed sequence may not affect their actions. For P , however, this information may be crucial in that it conveys information about its own type. Thus, P can choose her action depending on this information.
By reversing the sequence of PGG, we can discern two types of punisher:
cooperative (CP ) and opportunistic punisher (OP ). CP commits punishment, but cooperates regardless of information of commitment. OP commits punishment, but chooses whether to cooperate or not depending on the information. If there be few commitment, she might think that D would be better choice to free-ride C or not to be exploited by D. We assume that an individual punisher acts cooperatively with probability q that replies on the number of punisher G P . q(·) is given by 
Stochastic dynamics of CP case
Main results of Hauert et al. (2007) are regenerated in Figure 1 . At first, with voluntary participation, PGG takes circular movement around Cooperator
The existence of L can perturb universal defection, and make evolutionary cycle for three types, and this can be also observed by replicator dynamics (Hauert et al., 2002) . 4 Even though voluntary participation changes universal defection in PGG, the average payoff a player can get cannot exceed that of L. That is, volunteering itself does not enhance the fitness of team members in equilibrium. 5
As is shown in Appendix C, assuming infinitely large population, C − P equilibrium can be stabilized for some area in S 3 simplex. But, this result just shows that cooperation can be defended only when there already exists sufficient number of punisher. In stochastic dynamic setting, punishment alone cannot police D since the fitness of punisher cannot be higher than that of Fig. 1 ). This can be called "dilemma of punishment", which is that P can regulate defective behavior in a group, but the cost of punishment decrease the fitness of P . Eventually, unique homogeneous state stochastically stable is D because P cannot be always worse than D in homogeneous state of D. In sum, neither of L and P makes any significant contribution to the evolution of cooperation in PGG.
Interesting dynamics can be made when four types of players are involved in PGG. Panel (c) of Figure 1 shows
fixate P because of the existence of L. L, however, tends to be conquered by C and P . The movement between C and P is random drift or neutral selection, where all individuals have the same fitness. For this case, Any random walk in which the probability to move to either side is identical for the transient states leads to the same result. D can be regulated in a circular stochastic relation among four types, and L plays a pivotal role in making a detour for the evolution of cooperation. Hauert et al. (2007) named this mechanism "via freedom to coercion", which emphasize synergistic enforcement between L and P in the process.
The role of L has meaningful economic interpretation where L can be re-
0.07 Arrow from A to B means that A type can fixate B type, and fixation probability is given around the arrow. When a fixation probability is less than 1/M , it is rare event that one type fixates another. For dashed line, fixation probability is equal to 1/M that is the case of random drift. This automata-style presentation helps to illustrate stochastic dynamics of PGG. 
Stochastic dynamics of OP case
As is stated, players declare their commitment on punishing first, and choose actions in OP case. Assuming independence in choosing actions, the expected number of P in a team, which is equal to the number of commitment, is simply given by q ·G P . payoffs are modified for opportunistic punisher, and stochastic dynamics of OP case is given in Figure 3 .
Numerical examples implies that OP can contribute the evolution of cooperation in which CP loses her power as long as δ, the responsiveness of punisher, is sufficiently high. They imply that the efficacy of OP comes from dynamics make two type of NE . For this case, when β is low (but not too much), γ is low, and δ is high, C − OP mixture with high density of OP is NE. This is a equilibrium state that opportunism by P is sparsely observed because of high frequency of P . As is discussed, stochastic dynamics select this almost full cooperative state by OP over D-state when parameters are proper. Now, we consider how the opportunism of P helps the evolution of cooperation. Let us compare the behavior of OP to simple tremble or error in playing action. As Figure 5 shows simple tremble does not help to overcome invasion of D or fixating C, which is key part that OP plays. This implies that opportunistic punisher has more sophisticated strategic reaction than simple types of error.
The opportunism makes P play in a correlated way according to the com-position of her team informed by the level of commitment. For example, when a team consists all of C or D except a P , OP hardly do C because commitment level is low, and punishment from others is not expected. Thus, for C-only team case, the payoff of OP is higher than CP . For D-only team case, the payoff of OP is less than that of D, but higher than that of CP . In the opposite instance, if a team consists all of P except one P , OP always does C because playing D hurts her by ample of punishment. For this case P resembles CP . That is, assuming proper size of G and sets of parameter such as β, γ and δ, payoff of OP in three pure state are given by
for all-C case
where π k is the payoff of type k.
This strategic flexibility comes from nonlinearity made by probabilistic reaction modeled by q(G p ). When the degree of nonlinearity, δ, is sufficiently high, OP can copy better reaction between C and D in correlated way. This flexibility creates C → P fixation, and ends P → D fixation.
Calculating Fixation Probabilities by Fermi Function
As Appendix B shows, fixation probabilities of Moran process can be defined within a certain boundary of s, the intensity of selection. To generalize our model, a pair-wise comparison by Fermi function is to be introduced (Traulsen et al., 2006; Altrock and Traulsen, 2009) . Fermi function defines dynamics of payoff difference between two types for any s. 6 When transition from A-type
Figure 6: Key fixation diagrams of CP and OP . We assume proper parameters for unrelated variables. When β is larger than a critical level, D can fixate CP and the evolution of cooperation is made. When CP is less effective, OP can absorb C as long as δ is higher than a certain level. This prevents D from exploiting C, and the cooperation can be evolved by players' opportunistic behavior.
to B-type occurs, the probability is assumed to be
which is called called Fermi function. This makes
The evolution of cooperation can be analyzed by investigating fixation probabilities between four types. Specifically, as is implied in numerical examples in Section 3, the evolution of cooperation may depend on the fixation between P and D, and that between P and C.
We apply three approximations to get analytic expression. 1) As 1/M → 0 can be assumed for sufficiently high M , related payoffs can be linearized around 1/M ≈ 0 as many as necessary. 2) Approximated fixation probabilities are categorized into two; the one is surely larger than 1/M , the other cannot exceed it. We take the first kind as legitimate, and set the second to be 0.
3)
, which is plausible for fairly larger M .
Let ρ ij denote this simplified fixation probability of single i-type in the population that consists totally of j-type. Common fixation probabilities for each type of punisher are given by
At first, these are invariant by the type of punisher. High intensity increases ρ DC and ρ LD . When σ increases(decreases), the flow of D → L speeds up(down), but that of L → C speeds down(up). As is discussed in Section 3, when σ gets smaller, the frequency of L decreases, and that of C increases consequently. Without P , this flow ends up with higher frequency of D due to lower ρ LD .
At first, Figure 6 shows P → D and P → C fixation diagrams for each type of punisher. When β < β CP where where β CP ≡ G−r G(G−1) , fixation probabilities are respectively given by Figure 6 shows when CP is effective. When β < β CP , D can fixate P . The evolution of cooperation is hindered as numerical examples shows. For this instance, OP who plays opportunistically can make cooperation evolve in a team. C → P fixation is a key mechanism, which weakens C → D fixation.
Different from CP case where P and C have equal fitness, OP has higher fitness than C because OP tends to play D more as there exists more C. As the frequency of C decreases due to C → P fixation, the relative staying at D does also. Numerical examples shows that ρ P C for OP changes discontinuously for a critical level of δ, δ OP . This implies that players' responsiveness to the information can have a pivotal role in fostering the evolution of cooperation.
The analytic approach for this intuition can be done by Fermi function.
For CP , ρ P C is given by 1/M . For OP , when β and γ are low as necessary,
. By Fermi function, the fixation probability of ρ P C for OP behaves nicely in discontinuous way as numerical examples do.
Finally, two future research agenda is to be mentioned. First, in this paper, we regard δ as parameter, which determines the responsiveness of probabilistic opportunism. Even though simplicity justifies this, more interesting results and questions can be discussed if we make δ determined endogenously. Also, another simplification is that the commitment of punishing is always credible.
In real world, some forms of contracts are done in this fashion by depositing some of money to a third party for the case of non-fulfillment. However, partial credibility of commitment may reveal more interesting and unexpected results on the issues of this paper.
Appendix A The Stochastic Dynamics of Generalized Moran Process Moran process
Moran process is a classical model of population that is developed in population genetics, and has been imported to game theory recently. In every time step an individual is randomly chosen for reproduction by its fitness, and makes a single clone that replace a randomly selected other member. Moran process represents a simple birth-death process. For the whole process, the size of total population, M , remains constant, i.e., Moran process ignores effects of population size. This assumption of exogenous finite population size can be considered as an approximation to a model where environmental forces keep the population from becoming infinite .
For studying finite populations, it is convenient to transform fitness into convex combination of baseline fitness (generally assumed to be 1) and payoff obtained from interaction. That is, f = (1 − s)1 + sπ where f is fitness of a player, π is the payoff from the game. s controls the intensity of selection.
When s = 0, selection is neutral and we have random drift. For s → 1, fitness can be equated to payoff. Since f should be positive, there exists maximum s.
Fixation probability
Repeatedly applying Moran updating determines the evolutionary result of residents and mutants. In the absence of mutations, which is in the spirit of literature on large deviations of long-run behavior, Moran process ends up with a homogeneous population with all residents or all invaders (Foster and Young, 1990; Kandori et al., 1993; Young, 1993; Kandori and Rob, 1995 Let us explain how to find fixation probabilities by two-strategies case. For M -size population, the number of A-strategy players is j, and the number of B is M − j. The probability to increase the number of A from j to j + 1 is denoted by T + j . Similarly, T − j is probability to decrease j by 1. Considering that there exist two absorbing states with no-mutation game dynamics, two fixation probabilities is given by φ 0 = 0 and φ M = 1 where φ j is the fixation probability where the number of A is j. For intermediate state, the fixation probability are given by
which is an expression of fixation probability by its one back-and-forth time step. Rearrange (A.1) makes
2) can be suitably used to make a recursion for the differences between fixation probabilities. For our discussion φ 1 , the fixation probability of a single A individual, is particularly important. By some algebra, this is calculated as
It is possible to calculate fixation probability for any initial state of existing i-number of A, φ i Taylor et al., 2004) . Only φ 1 is needed to investigate stationary distribution with small mutations.
For neutral selection where drift is purely random, T − j = T + j holds, hence φ 1 is easily given by 1/M . This fixation probability of random drift is used to judge how strong a single individual enough to fixate whole population.
When the fixation probability of a specific individual of a type is larger than 1/M , there is a statistical tendency for this type to occupy the whole population. Otherwise, this type is easy to be fixated by other types whose fixation probabilities are larger than 1/M . This criteria about fixation has a good interpretation to describe mutual invasion between two types, which is useful for our purpose. 7 .
As the fitness should be positive for proper φ ij , an upper limit on s is given by 1/(1 − min π ij ).
Fixation probabilities are used for making a Markov transition matrix between four different homogeneous states, which is
Above matrix defines entry and exit between four homogeneous states.
For example, first row describes how one mutant C influences system. The second elements of this row shows the probability that a single mutant C conquers or fixates D-homogeneous state. Naturally, sum of each column should be 1. Fudenberg and Imhof (2006) shows that normalized eigenvector to the biggest eigenvalue, 1 for this case, determines stationary distribution for small mutations.
Appendix C Replicator Dynamics and Stable NE
Replicator dynamics for PGG in the paper can be derived by formulating payoff for each type of player. For C − D − CP , of S 3 , and interior dynamics can be described by Hamiltonian system. This is equivalent to rock-paper-scissor dynamics where rest point is surrounded by periodic orbits as is shown in Figure 8 . Cooperative equilibrium made by OP in stochastic dynamics is the case of (a) with low β, low γ and high δ. p OP in (a) of Figure 9 is given by
